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I. THEOPHRASTUS ON PLATO AND THE PYTHAGOREANS (METAPHYSICS 11A6-B12) 
 
Plato and the Pythagoreans make the distance [between the first principles and everything else] 
a great one, and they make all things desire to imitate fully; and yet, they set up a certain 
opposition, as it were, between the Indefinite Dyad and the One.  In the former [resides] the 
Unlimited and the Unordered and, as it were, all Shapelessness as such; and they make it 
altogether impossible for the nature of the universe to exist without this [that is, the Indefinite 
Dyad] – it [that is, the Indefinite Dyad] could only have an equal share in things, or even 
exceed, the other [first principle, that is, the One] – whereby they also make their first principles 
contrary [to one another].  Therefore, those who ascribe causation to god claim that not even 
god is able to reduce all things to the best, but, even if at all, only insofar as is possible.  And 
perhaps he wouldn’t even choose to, if indeed it were to result in the destruction of all 
existence, given that it [that is, existence] is constituted from contraries and consists of 
contraries. 
 
Πλάτων δὲ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι µακρὰν τὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἐπιµιµεῖσθαι τ’ ἐθέλειν ἅπαντα· 
καίτοι καθάπερ ἀντίθεσιν τινα ποιοῦσιν τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, ἐν ᾗ καὶ τὸ 
ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ ἄτακτον καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν πᾶσα ἀµορφία καθ’ αὑτήν, ὅλως δ’ οὐχ οἷον τ’ ἄνευ 
ταύτης τὴν τοὺ ὅλου φύσιν, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἰσοµοιρεῖν ἢ καὶ ὑπερέχειν τῆς ἐτέρας, ᾗ καὶ τὰς 
ἀρχὰς ἐναντίας.  διὸ καὶ οὐδὲ τὸν θεόν, ὅσοι τῷ θεῷ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνάπτουσιν, δύνασθαι 
πάντ’ εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ἄγειν, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται· τάχα δ’ οὐδ’ ἂν προέλοιτ’, 
εἴπερ ἀναιρεῖσθαι συµβήσεται τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν ἐξ ἐναντίων γε καὶ ἐν ἐναντίοις οὖσαν. 
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II. APPROPRIATION AS FAMILIARIZATION: ANTISTHENES OF ATHENS ON PYTHAGORAS 
POLUTROPOS (PORPHYRY, QUESTIONS ON HOMER’S ODYSSEY 1.1-3.2 SCHRADER = SSR V A 187; 
TRANS. AFTER BOYS-STONES AND ROWE) 
 
This is why Homer says that Odysseus is, as a wise man, a man of many modes, because he 
knows many modes of intercourse with men.  In a similar way, Pythagoras is also said to have 
crafted his words appropriately when speaking to children, addressing them with child-like 
speech, and for women, speech appropriate for women; worlds of leadership for leaders, and 
youthful speech for the young.  To discover the mode of wisdom appropriate to each person is 
the mark of wisdom... 
 
διὰ τοῦτο φησι τὸν Ὀδυσσὲα Ὅµηρος σοφὸν ὄντα πολύτροπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τοῖς 
ἄνθρώποις ἠπίστατο πολλοῖς τρόποις συνεῖναι.  οὕτω καὶ Πυθαγόρας λέγεται πρὸς 
παῖδας ἀξιωθεὶς ποιήσασθαι λόγους διαθεῖναι πρὸς αὐτοὺς λόγους παιδικοὺς καὶ πρὸς 
γυναῖκας γυναιξὶν ἁρµοδίους καὶ πρὸς ἄρχοντας ἀρχοντικοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἐφήβους ἐφηβικούς.  
τὸν γὰρ ἑκάστοις πρόσφορον τρόπον τῆς σοφίας ἐξευρίσκειν σοφίας ἐστίν˙ 
 
 
IΙΙ. APPROPRIATION AS ALLEGORICAL EXEGESIS: ARISTIPPUS OF CYRENE ON PYTHAGORAS’ 
NAME (D.L. 8.21 = SSR IV A 150) 
 
...he was named Pythagoras because he, no less than the Pythian, orated the truth. 
Πυθαγόραν αὐτὸν ὀνοµασθῆναι ὅτι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἠγόρευεν οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ Πυθίου. 
 
IV. APPROPRIATION AS CLASSIFICATION AND PRAGMATIC EXPLANATION: ANAXIMANDER OF 
MILETUS’ EXPLANATION OF THE PYTHAGOREAN SYMBOLS (FGRHIST 9 T 1 = SUDA, S.V. 
ἈΝΑΞΙΜΑΝΔΡΟΣ ἈΝΑΞΙΜΑΝΔΡΟΥ) 
 
[Anaximander] wrote an Explanation of the Pythagorean Symbols, of which some examples are, 
“do not overstep the yoke”, “do not poke fire with a knife”, “do not eat a loaf of bread whole”. 
etc. 
 
ἔγραψε Συµβόλων Πυθαγορείων Ἐξήγησιν.  οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ‘ζυγὸν µὴ ὐπερβαίνειν’˙ 
‘µαχαίραι πῦρ µὴ σκαλεύειν’˙ ἀπὸ ὁλοκλήρου ἄρτου µὴ ἐσθίειν’˙ καὶ τὰ λοιπά. 
 
 
V. HIPPIAS OF ELIS AND COLLECTION OF THE ‘MOST IMPORTANT [SAYINGS?]’ OF HIS 
PREDECESSORS (DK 86 B 6 = CLEM. STROM. 6.15; TRANS. AFTER MANSFELD)   
 
It may be the case that some of these things have been said briefly by others, each at a different 
place: some by Orpheus and some by Musaeus, some by Hesiod and some by Homer, some by 
others among the poets, and some in prose-writings, some by Greeks, and some by non-Greeks.  
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For my part, I have collected from all these (sources) the most important and kindred [sayings?] 
in order to compose the present original miscellany. 
 
τούτων ἴσως εἴρηται τὰ µὲν Ὀρφεῖ, τὰ δὲ Μουσαίωι κατὰ βραχὺ ἄλλωι ἀλλαχοῦ, τὰ δὲ 
Ἡσιόδωι τὰ δὲ Ὁµήρωι, τὰ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν ποιητῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐν συγγραφαῖς τὰ µὲν 
Ἕλλησι τὰ δὲ βαρβάροις˙ ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκ πάντων τούτων τὰ µέγιστα καὶ ὁµόφυλα συνθεὶς 
τοῦτον καινὸν πολυειδῆ τὸν λόγον ποιήσοµαι. 
 
 
VI. ARISTOTLE’S CLASSIFICATION OF THE PYTHAGOREAN ACUSMATA (IAMBLICHUS, ON THE 
PYTHAGOREAN LIFE 82-83; TRANS. AFTER DILLON AND HERSHBELL) 
 
The philosophy of the acusmatici consists of acusmata undemonstrated, that is, lacking a 
rationale, e.g. ‘one ought to do in this way’; and other acusmata, as many as were said by that 
man [i.e. Pythagoras], these they [i.e. the acusmatici] attempt to preserve as the divine doctrines.  
Neither do they pretend to be speaking for themselves, nor ought one do so, but even among 
themselves they suppose that those who grasp the most acusmata are best situated in regard to 
practical wisdom.  And these so-called ‘acusmata’ are distinguished into three kinds: some 
signify ‘what is’, others ‘what is to the greatest degree’, and others ‘what ought or ought not to 
be done’.  Those that signify ‘what is’ are of this sort: “what are the islands of the blessed?  Sun 
and moon.”; “what is the oracle at Delphi?  The tetraktys (which is the harmony in which the 
sirens exist).” 
 
Those [that signify] ‘what is to the greatest degree’ are, e.g., “what is most just? To sacrifice”; 
what is wisest? Number.”...[list of ‘what is to the greatest degree?’ acusmata]...These and similar 
things are the acusmata of this kind; for each of them signifies what is to the greatest degree.  
And this [i.e. philosophy] is the same as that which is called the wisdom of the Seven Sages.  For 
they too sought not what is the good, but what is [good] to the greatest degree; not what is 
difficult, but what is most difficult (e.g. to know oneself); not what is easy, but what is easiest 
(e.g. to indulge in habit)...[insertion by Iamblichus?]... 
 
Those of the acusmata which signify what ought or ought not to be done were of this sort: one 
ought to beget children (for it is necessary to leave behind people to serve god)...etc.  
 
ἔστι δὲ ἡ µὲν τῶν ἀκουσµατικῶν φιλοσοφία ἀκούσµατα ἀναπόδεικτα καὶ ἄνευ λόγου, ὅτι 
οὕτως πρακτέον, καὶ τἆλλα, ὅσα παρ’ ἐκείνου ἐρρέθη, ταῦτα πειρῶνται διαφυλάττειν ὡς 
θεῖα δόγµατα, αὐτοὶ δὲ παρ’ αὑτῶν οὔτε λέγειν προσποιοῦνται οὔτε λεκτέον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ αὑτῶν ὑπολαµβάνουσι τούτους ἔχειν βέλτιστα πρὸς φρόνησιν, οἵτινες πλεῖστα 
ἀκούσµατα ἔσχον. πάντα δὲ τὰ οὕτως <καλούµενα> ἀκούσµατα διῄρηται εἰς τρία εἴδη˙ τὰ 
µὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν τί ἐστι σηµαίνει, τὰ δὲ τί µάλιστα, τὰ δὲ τί δεῖ πράττειν ἢ µὴ πράττειν.  τὰ 
µὲν οὖν τί ἐστι τοιαῦτα, οἷον τί ἐστιν αἱ µακάρων νῆσοι; ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη.  τί ἐστι τὸ ἐν 
Δελφοῖς µαντεῖον; τετρακτύς.  ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἁρµονία, ἐν ᾗ αἱ Σειρῆνες. 
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τὰ δὲ τί µάλιστα, οἷον τί τὸ δικαιότατον; θύειν.  τί τὸ σοφώτατον; ἀριθµός...ταῦτα καὶ 
τοιαῦτα ἐστι τὰ τούτου τοῦ γένους ἀκούσµατα˙ ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων µάλιστά τί 
ἐστιν.  ἔστι δ’αὕτη ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφιστῶν λεγοµένῃ σοφίᾳ.  καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι 
ἐζήτουν, οὐ τί ἐστι τἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τί µάλιστα˙ οὐδὲ τί τὸ χαλεπόν, ἀλλὰ τί τὸ 
χαλεπώτατον (ὅτι τὸ αὑτὸν γνῶναι ἐστιν)˙ οὐδὲ τί τὸ ῥᾴδιον, ἀλλὰ τί τὸ ῥᾷστον (ὅτι τὸ 
ἔθει χρῆσθαι)... 
 
τὰ δὲ τί πρακτέον ἢ οὐ πρακτέον τῶν ἀκουσµάτων τοιαῦτά ἐστιν, οἷον ὅτι δεῖ 
τεκνοποιεῖσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ ἀντικαταλιπεῖν τοὺς θεραπεύοντας τὸν θεόν)... 
 
 
VII. ARISTOTLE’S TRIPARTITE DIVISION OF PROPOSITIONS (TOPICS 1.14, 105B19-25)  
 
It is possible to encompass three classes of propositions and problems in a sketch.   Some 
propositions are ethical, some are scientific, and some are logical.  Propositions such as these, 
then, are ethical: “should one obey parents rather than laws, if they are at variance?”  Logical 
propositions are such as, “is knowledge of contraries the same or not?” Scientific propositions 
are such as, “is the universe eternal or not?”  And similarly also with the problems. 
 
ἔστι δ’ ὡς τύπῳ περιλαβεῖν τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τῶν προβληµάτων µέρη τρία˙ αἱ µὲν γὰρ 
ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ λογικαί.  ἠθικαὶ µὲν οὖν αἱ τοιαῦται, οἷον 
πότερον δεῖ τοῖς γονεῦσι µᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς νόµοις πειθαρχεῖν, ἐὰν διαφωνῶσιν˙ λογικαὶ δὲ 
οἷον πότερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστηµὴ ἢ οὐ˙ φυσικαὶ δὲ οἷον πότερον ὁ κόσµος 
ἀίδιος ἢ οὐ. ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ προβλήµατα. 
 
 
VIII. XENOCRATES AND THE TRIPARTITE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY (SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, 
AGAINST THE LOGICIANS 1.16 = XENOCRATES F 82 ISNARDI PARENTE) 
 
These thinkers [i.e. those who hold that philosophy has one or two parts], however, seem to 
have handled the question deficiently and, in comparison with them, those who say that a part 
of philosophy is physics, another ethics, and another logic, [seem to have handled the question] 
more completely.  Of these, Plato is a pioneer, [at least] potentially, as he made many discussions 
on many issues of physics and ethics, and not a few on logic; but those associated with 
Xenocrates, as well as those [who come] from the Peripatos and those too from the Stoa, adopt 
this division most expressly. 
 
πλὴν οὗτοι µὲν ἐλλιπῶς ἀνεστράφθαι δοκοῦσιν, ἐντελέστερον δὲ παρὰ τούτους οἱ εἰπόντες 
τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ µέν τι εἶναι φυσικὸν τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν˙ ὧν δυνάµει µὲν Πλάτων 
ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός, περὶ πολλῶν µὲν φυσικῶν πολλῶν δὲ ἠθικῶν οὐκ ὀλίγων δὲ λογικῶν 
διαλεχθείς˙  ῥητότατα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενοκράτην καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ 
τῆς στοᾶς ἔχονται τῆσδε τῆς διαιρέσεως.  
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ΙΧ. XENOCRATES ON THE PRECEPTS OF TRIPTOLEMUS (PORPHYRY, ON ABSTINENCE 4.22.2-5 = 
HERMIPPUS FGRHIST 1026 F 4  = XENOCRATES F 252 ISNARDI PARENTE) 
 
They say that Triptolemus laid down precepts for the Athenians, and of his precepts the 
philosopher Xenocrates says that the following three still remain in force at Eleusis: ‘Honor thy 
parents’; ‘Offer first-fruits to the gods’; and ‘do no harm to animals’.  Well, then, the first two he 
[i.e. Xenocrates] considers to have been handed down excellently: for we ought to do well in 
return unto our parents to the best of our ability, as they are our benefactors; and we ought to 
offer first-fruits to the gods, by whom first-fruits were given for our livelihood.  But regarding 
the third precept he raises the question, “what did Triptolemus intend when he enjoined 
abstinence from eating animals?  Did he simply consider,” he says, “that it would be a terrible 
thing to kill one’s kindred, or did he rather observe that it happens that they are killed by men 
because they are the most useful of living things for nourishment?  So it would be through 
wishing to render his life civilized that he tried to preserve those animals which were 
domesticated and the companions of men.  Unless perhaps, assuming that we should honor the 
gods through an offering of first-fruits, he thought that this prerogative would be better 
preserved if animal sacrifices were not offered to the gods.”  Xenocrates gives many other 
reasons for this precept, none of them very precise, but it is sufficient for our purpose to note 
that this precept was legislated by Triptolemus. 
 
φασὶ δὲ καὶ Τριπτόλεµον Ἀθηναίοις νοµοθετῆσαι, καὶ τῶν νόµων αὐτοῦ τρεῖς ἔτι 
Ξενοκράτης ὁ φιλόσοφος λέγει διαµένειν Ἐλευσῖνι τούσδε˙ γονεῖς τιµᾶν, θεοὺς καρποῖς 
ἀγάλλειν, ζῷα µὴ σίνεσθαι.  τοὺς µὲν οὖν δύο καλῶς παραδοθῆναι˙ δεῖ γὰρ τοὺς µὲν 
γονεῖς εὐεργέτας ἡµῶν γεγενηµένους ἀντ’ εὖ ποιεῖν ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, τοῖς θεοῖς δὲ αφ’ 
ὧν ἔδωκαν ἡµῖν εἰς τὸν βίον ἀπαρχὰς ποιεῖσθαι˙ περὶ δὲ τοῦ τρίτου διαπορεῖ, τί ποτε 
διανοηθεὶς ὁ Τριπτόλεµος παρήγγειλεν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ζῴων.  πότερον γάρ, φησίν, ὅλως 
οἰόµενος εἶναι δεινὸν τὸ ὁµογενὲς κτείνειν ἢ συνιδὼν ὅτι συνέβαινεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰ 
χρησιµώτατα τῶν ζῴων εἰς τροφὴν ἀναιρείσθαι;  βουλόµενον οὖν ἥµερον ποιῆσαι τὸν 
βίον πειραθῆναι καὶ τὰ συνανθρωπεύοντα καὶ µάλιστα τῶν ζῴων ἥµερα διασῴζειν.  εἰ µὴ 
ἄρα διὰ τὸ προστάξαι τοῖς καρποῖς τοὺς θεοὺς τιµᾶν ὑπολαβὼν µᾶλλον ἂν διαµεῖναι τὴν 
τιµὴν ταύτην, εἰ µὴ γίγνοιντο τοῖς θεοῖς διὰ τῶν ζῴων θυσίαι.  πολλὰς δὲ αἰτίας τοῦ 
Ξενοκράτους καὶ ἄλλας οὐ πάνυ ἀκριβεῖς ἀποδιδόντος ἡµῖν ἄυταρκες τοσοῦτον ἐκ τῶν 
εἰρηµένων, ὅτι τοῦτο νενοµοθέτητο ἐκ τοῦ Τριπτολέµου.   
 
 
Χ. NON-ALLEGORICAL EXEGESIS: IAMBLICHUS ON XENOCRATES ON PYTHAGORAS (IAMBLICHUS, 
ON THE PYTHAGOREAN LIFE 7 = XENOCRATES F 221 ISNARDI PARENTE; TRANS. AFTER DILLON 
AND HERSHBELL) 
 
And when she [i.e. Parthenis] gave birth in Sidon of Phoenicia, he [i.e. Mnemarchus] called the 
son born ‘Pythagoras’, because the Pythian greeted him [by name].  We must reject here the 
view of Epimenides, Eudoxus, and Xenocrates, who explained that Apollo had intercourse with 
Parthenis at that time, and when she was not pregnant, he made her so, and announced it 
through his prophetess.   
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ἐν δὲ Σιδόνι τῆς Φοινίκης ἀποτεκούσης αὐτῆς τὸν γενόµενον υἱὸν Πυθαγόραν 
προσηγόρευσεν, ὅτι ἄρα ὑπὸ τοῦ Πυθίου προηγορεύθη αὐτῷ.  παραιτητέοι γὰρ ἐνταῦθα 
Ἐπιµενίδες καὶ Ἐὔδοξος καὶ Ξενοκράτης, ὑπονοοῦντες τῇ Παρθενίδι τότε µιγῆναι τὸν 
Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ κύουσαν αὐτὴν ἐκ µὴ οὕτως ἐχούσης καταστῆσαί τε καὶ προαγγεῖλαι διὰ 
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